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Abstract. We present an algorithm for the Merkle tree traversal problem which combines the efficient
space-time trade-off from the fractal Merkle tree [3] and the space efficiency from the improved log
space-time Merkle trees traversal [8]. We give an exhaustive analysis of the space and time efficiency
of our algorithm in function of the parameters H (the height of the Merkle tree) and h (h = H
L
where
L is the number of levels in the Merkle tree). We also analyze the space impact when a continuous
deterministic pseudo–random number generator (PRNG) is used to generate the leaves. We further
program a low storage–space and a low time–overhead version of the algorithm in Java and measure its
performance with respect to the two different implementations cited above. Our implementation uses
the least space when a continuous PRNG is used for the leaf calculation.
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1 Introduction
Merkle’s binary hash trees are currently very popular, because their security is independent from any
number theoretic conjectures [6]. Indeed their security is based solely on two well defined properties
of hash functions: (i) Pre-image resistance: that is, given a hash value v, it is difficult to find a
message m such that v = hash(m). The generic pre-image attack requires 2n calls to the hash
function, where n is the size of the output in bits. (ii) Collision resistance: that is, finding two
messages m1 6= m2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2) is difficult. The generic complexity of such an
attack is given by the birthday bound which is 2n/2 calls to the hash function. It is interesting to
note that the best quantum algorithm to date for searching N random records in a data base (an
analogous problem to hash pre-image resistance) achieves only a speedup of O(√N) to the classical
one O(N) [15]. More to the point in [14] the speedup of a quantum algorithm that finds collisions
in arbitrary r-to-one functions is O( 3√N/r) to the classical one.
A Merkle tree is a complete binary tree with a n-bit hash value associated with each node. Each
internal node value is the result of a hash of the node values of its children. Merkle trees are
designed so that a leaf value can be verified with respect to a publicly known root value given the
authentication path of the respective leaf. The authentication path for a leaf consists of one node
value at each level l, where l = 0, · · · , H − 1, and H is the height of the Merkle tree (H ≤ 20 in
most practical cases). The chosen nodes are siblings of the nodes on the path connecting the leaf to
the root.
The Merkle tree traversal problem answers the question of how to calculate efficiently1 the authen-
tication path for all leaves one after another starting with the first Leaf0 up to the last Leaf2H−1,
if there is only a limited amount of storage available (e.g. in Smartcards ).
1 The authors of [7] proved that the bounds of space (O(tH/log(t))) and time (O(H/log(t)))) for the output of the
authentication path of the current leaf are optimal (t is a freely choosable parameter).
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2The generation of the root of the Merkle tree (the public key in a Merkle signature system) requires
the computation of all nodes in the tree. This means a grand total of 2H leaves’ evaluations and
of 2H − 1 hash computations. The root value (the actual public key) is then stored into a trusted
database accessible to the verifier.
The leaves of a Merkle tree are used either as a one–time token to access resources or as building
block for a digital signature scheme. Each leaf has an associated private key that is used to generate
either the token or a signature building block (see 4.2). The tokens can be as simple as a hash
of the private key. In the signature case, more complex schemes are used in the literature (see for
example [2] for a review).
Related work
Two solutions to the Merkle tree traversal problem exist. The first is built on the classical tree
traversal algorithm but with many small improvements [8] (called log algorithm from now on). The
second one is the fractal traversal algorithm [3] (called fractal algorithm from now on). The fractal
algorithm trades efficiently space against time by adapting the parameter h (the height of both
Desired and Exist subtrees, see Fig. 1), however the minimal space it uses for any given H (if h is
chosen for space optimality) is more than what the log algorithm needs. The log algorithm cannot
as effectively trade space for performance. However, for small H it can still achieve a better time
and space trade-off than the fractal algorithm.
A study [7] analyses theoretically the impact on space and time–bounds of some enhancements to
both the log and fractal algorithm, which are important to our implementation.
Our contributions
We developed an algorithm for the Merkle tree traversal problem which combines the efficient
space-time trade-off from [3] with the space efficiency from [8]. This was done by applying all the
improvements discussed in [8] to the fractal algorithm [3]. We have also analyzed the space impact
of a continuous deterministic pseudo–random number generator (PRNG)2 on the algorithms. All
these improvements lead to an algorithm with a worst case storage of [L×2h+2H−2h] hash values
(Sec. 4.4). The worst case time bound for the leaves’ computation per authentication path, amounts
to 2
h−1
2h
× (L− 1)+1 (Sec. 4.4). This means a reduction in space of about a factor 2 compared with
the fractal algorithm [3] (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 4).
Although on first sight our enhancements are predated by [7] three main differences distinguish
our contribution vis-à-vis [7]: (i) Our use of a different TreeHash and metrics; (ii) Our special
computation of the Desired tree (see Section 4.2) and (iii) Our use of a continuous PRNG in leaf
computation.
We further implemented the algorithm in Java with focus on a low space and time overhead [1] and
we measured its performance (Sec. 6).
2 Preliminaries
The idea of the fractal algorithm [3] is to store only a limited set of subtrees within the whole
Merkle tree (see Fig. 1). They form a stacked series of L subtrees {Subtreei}L−1i=0 . Each subtree
2 A deterministic pseudo–random number generator which can not access any random number in its range without
first computing all the preceding ones.
3consists of an Exist tree {Existi} and a Desired tree {Desiredi}, except for SubtreeL−1, which
has no Desired tree. The Exist trees contain the authentication path for the current leaf. When the
authentication path for the next leaf is no longer contained in some Exist trees, these are replaced
by the Desired tree of the same subtree. The Desired trees are built incrementally after each
output of the authentication path algorithm, thus minimizing the operations needed to evaluate the
subtree.
Merkle [Mer89] addressed the problem of key man-
agement, introducing the method of tree authentication.
In [Mer89], originally published in 1979, the concept of
a hash tree is presented, which provides efficient key
management for a large number of one-time signatures.
The recent works of [JLMS03], [Szy04a], [BKN04]
improve Merkle’s hash-tree method [Mer89] and give the
ability to handle large hash trees more efficiently. The
focus of [JLMS03] was to obtain space-time trade off,
the focus of [Szy04a] was very low space solution, and
[BKN04] combined the two. As an example, Jakobsson
et al.’s suggested to use their algorithm for one-time
signature. A proof of concept code for their idea was
implemented in [Col03] with some basic performance
results.
Recently, a work of Seys and Preneel [SP05] provided
a power consumption estimation of one-time signatures
schemes, for low power mobile platforms. Their work
estimates the overall power consumption of the signa-
ture schemes of Winternitz and Reyzin, with the key
management techniques of Jakobsson et al. [JLMS03]
and Perrig [Per01].
The work closest to ours was recently suggested
independently by Coronado [Cor05]. The work used a
different traversal technique by [Szy04a] and focused on
forward security of the scheme rather than on achieving
fast signatures; therefore, we cannot directly compare
Coronado’s results with ours.
C. Contributions
Our first contribution is a design of a signature scheme
we call FMTseq - Fractal Merkle Tree sequential signa-
tures. FMTseq combines Merkle’s one-time signatures
with Jakobsson et al.’s algorithm for hash tree traversal.
We refine [JLMS03] construction and complete the de-
tails for a practical scheme to provide many one-time
signatures with the same hash tree. In contrast with
[JLMS03] our work follows Merkle’s original suggestion
for hash tree construction which is more efficient and
conceptually natural.
Next, we provide an efficient implementation of a
scheme that significantly improves the preliminary im-
plementation [Col03] (see also [Szy04b]). Our experi-
mental results show that FMTseq is one- or two-orders
of magnitude faster than RSA, with low signature sizes
and signer storage requirements.
We consider applications that wish to obtain fast
signature rates while keeping the run-time space and
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Fig. 1. Fractal merkle tree notations
signature size reasonable. We show that when selecting
the parameter values for the scheme, rather than using
the low space solution of [JLMS03], we can trade a few
additional kilobytes of signer run-time storage to obtain
faster signature rates.
Full details can be found in [NSW05].
II. FRACTAL MERKLE TREE SEQUENTIAL ONE-TIME
SIGNATURES
In this section we describe our scheme for sequential
one-time signatures using fractal Merkle tree algorithm
[JLMS03]. The fractal Merkle tree algorithm is a scheme
for sequential traversal of a Merkle hash tree, i.e.,
providing the authentication path for each leaf when the
leaves are used one after the other. The scheme requires
a computational effort of 2 logN/ log logN and a run-
time space of 1.5 log2N/ log logN nodes.
Notation: A hash tree T of height H is divided into
L levels, each of height h. The leaves of the hash tree
are indexed {0, 1, ..., 2H − 1} from left to right. The
altitude of a node n is defined as the height of the
maximal subtree for which it is the root and ranges from
0 (for the leaves), to H (for the root). An h-subtree is
“at level i” when the altitude of its root is ih for some
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}. For each i there are 2H−ih such h-
subtrees at level i. A series of h-subtrees {Treei}Li=1 is
a stacked series if for all i < L the root of Treei is a
leaf of Treei+1. The notations are illustrated in Figure
1.
In our scheme, the secrets of each one-time signatures
are generated by a pseudo-random number generator.
The value of each leaf of the fractal Merkle tree is a hash
over all the commitments of a single one-time signature.
Therefore, each leaf serves as a public commitment
256
Fig. 1: Fractal Merkle tree structure and notation (Figure courtesy of [3]). A hash tree of height H
is divided into L levels, each of height h. The leave of the hash tree are indexed {0, 1, ..., 2H − 1}
from left to right. The height of a node is defined as the height of the maximal subtree for which it
is the root and ranges from 0 (for the leaves) to H (for the root). An h-subtree is "at level i" when
the height of its root is (i+ 1)h for some i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L− 1}.
The nodes in a Merkle tree are calculated with an algorithm called TreeHash. The algorithm takes
as input a stack of nodes, a leaf calculation function and a hash function and it outputs an updated
stack, whose top node is the newly calculated node. Each node n th stack has a height i that
defines on what level of the Merkle tree this node lies: i = 0 for the leaves and i = H for the
root. The TreeHash algorithm works in small steps. On each step the algorithm looks at its stack
and if the top two e em nts have the same height it pops them and puts the hash value of their
concatenation back onto the top of stack which now represents the parent node of the two popped
ones. Its height is one level higher than the height of its children. If the top two nodes do not have
the same height, the algorithm calculates the next leaf and puts it onto the stack, this node has a
height of zero.
We quickly summarize the three main areas where our improvements were critical for a better
space–time performance of the original fractal algorithm:
1. Left nodes have the nice property, that when they first appear in an authentication path, their
children were already on an earlier authentication path (see Fig. 2). For right nodes this property
does not hold. We can use this fact to calculate left nodes just before they are needed for the
authentication path without the need to stor th m in the subtrees. So we can save half of
the space needed for the subtrees, but compared to the fractal algorithm one additional leaf
4calculation has to be carried out every two rounds (one round corresponds to the calculation of
one authentification path).
2. In most practical applications, the calculation of a leaf is more expensive than the calculation
of an inner node3. This can be used to design a variant of the TreeHash algorithm, which has
a worst case time performance that is nearer to its average case for most practical applications.
The improved TreeHash (see Algorithm 1) given one leaf, calculates as many inner nodes as
possible per update (see Section 4.1) before needing a new leaf, instead of processing just one
leaf or one inner node as in the normal case.
3. In the fractal Merkle tree one TreeHash instance per subtree exists for calculating the nodes
of the Desired trees and each of them gets two updates per round. Therefore all of them have
nodes on their stacks which need space of the order of O(H2h ). We can distribute the updates in
another way, so that the associated stacks are mostly empty [5]. This reduces the space needed
by the stacks of the TreeHash instances to O(H − h).
It is easy enough to adapt point one and two for the fractal algorithm, but point three needs
some changes in the way the nodes in a subtree are calculated (see Sec. 4.2).
Algorithm 1 Listing: Generic version of TreeHash that accepts different types of Processi (See
Appendix A for a thorough definition of Processi). A node has a height and an index, where the
index indicates where a node is positioned in relation to all nodes with the same height in the Merkle
tree.
INPUT : StackOfNodes,Leaf,Processi, SubtreeIndex
OUTPUT : updated StackOfNodes
Node← Leaf
if Node.index (mod 2) == 1 then
continue← Processi(Node,SubtreeIndex)
else
continue← 1
end if
while continue 6= 0 ∧ (Node.height == StackOfNodes.top.height) do
Node← hash(StackOfNodes.pop||Node)
continue← Processi(Node,SubtreeIndex)
end while
if continue 6= 0 then
StackOfNodes.push(Node)
end if
3 Algorithm’s overview
In this Section we will give an overview of the complete algorithm and explain how all its components
work together. The algorithm is divided into two phases. The first phase is the initialisation phase
in which the public key is calculated (see Alg. 2). We run in this phase the improved TreeHash(see
3 A inner node is a node with height greater than zero.
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Fig. 2: The colored lines mark the different authentication paths. The index I at the start of each
line indicates how many times a node on level L of the authentication path has changed. An
authentication path whose node has changed I times on level L has changed I × (2L) times on level
0 (which changes each round). The dotted circles are left nodes or the root of a subtree which are
not stored in a subtree.
Alg. 1) from [8], step by step until the root node is computed. The improved TreeHash algorithm
needs Leafi where i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2H − 1} as an input.
The value of Leafi is dependent on the usage of the Merkle tree. It could be as simple as a token,
where the leaf is a hash of the tokens private key, or a one time signature scheme like Winternitz [6]
where the leaf is the public key of the one–time signature. The private keys needed to compute the
leaves are provided by a PRNG, whose key corresponds to the private key of the complete Merkle
tree.
In the initialisation phase each node is computed exactly once. This fact is used to store all right
nodes in the first Exist tree of each subtree and all the nodes in the authentication path for the
Leaf0. The second phase iteratively generates the authentication paths for all the remaining Leafi
(from left to right) where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2H − 1} (see Alg. 8 and Alg. 7). Each authentication path
can be computed by changing the previous one [6]. The authentication path for Leafi changes on a
level k if 2k|i. If the node changes to a right node, it can be found in one of the Exist trees. If it
changes to a left node, it can be computed from its two children. The right child can be found in
the Exist trees and the left child is on the previous authentication path (see Fig. 2).
When a node in the Exist tree is no longer needed for the computation of any upcoming
authentication path, it is removed. To prevent the Exist tree running out of nodes, all the nodes in
the Desired tree have to be computed before the Exist tree has no nodes left. This is done with the
help of two TreeHash instances per subtree. One, called the lower TreeHash, calculates all nodes
on the bottom level4 of a Desired tree (called bottom level nodes) from the leaves of the Merkle
tree. The other, called the higher TreeHash, calculates all the remaining Desired nodes5 (called
non-bottom level nodes) from the bottom level ones. All the lower TreeHash instances use the same
scheduling algorithm as in [8] with L− 1 updates per round. The higher TreeHash uses a custom
4 The bottom level is the lowest level in a Desired tree.
5 Desired nodes are all the nodes stored in a Desired tree.
6scheduling algorithm which executes an update every 2bottomLevel rounds. The higher TreeHash
produces a node on a level k in the Desired tree every 2k rounds, which corresponds to the rate
at which the authentication path changes on that level. When the last node from the Exist tree is
removed, all the nodes in the Desired tree are computed and the Exist tree can be replaced with
the Desired tree. In section 4.3 we will prove that the lower TreeHashes produce the nodes on
the bottom level before the higher TreeHashes need them, if L− 1 updates are done per round. A
lower TreeHash, which has terminated, is initialized again as soon as the generated node is used
as input for the higher TreeHash. Because only the right nodes are stored in the subtrees, the
TreeHashes do only have to compute right nodes and those left nodes which are used to calculate
a right node contained in the Desired tree. The only left nodes never used to compute a right
node in a Desired tree are the first left node at each level in each Desired tree. To ensure that no
unneeded nodes are computed, the lower TreeHash does not compute nodes for its first 2bottomLevel
updates per Desired tree and so does the higher TreeHash for its first update per Desired tree.
These skipped updates are nevertheless counted without the scheduling algorithm assigning them
to another TreeHash. Therefore from the point of view of the scheduling algorithm the TreeHash
behaves as if the nodes would have been computed.
4 Analysis
4.1 TreeHash Metrics
Below we give some definitions that will firstly permit a better understanding of our analysis and
secondly, unify all the similar concepts scattered in the literature. We define as classical TreeHash
the algorithm used in [3]. In that paper a stepC is defined as the calculation of either one leaf or the
node’s hash. We define as improved TreeHash the algorithm used in [8]. Therein a stepI is defined as
the calculation of the sum of one leaf and X hashes (where X is the number of nodes’ computations
before a new leaf is needed). We define update = 2 × stepC in the case of the classical TreeHash
and update = 1× stepI in the case of the improved TreeHash.
Since in our work we assume that the hash computation time is very small compared to a leaf’s
computation (an assumption certainly valid for MSS (Merkle Signature Scheme)), we use as the
basic time unit (metrics) for this work the time we need to compute a leaf.
So we can claim that in the worst case condition a classical TreeHash update takes 2 leaves’
computations whereas an improved TreeHash update takes only one. For the calculation of all nodes
in a tree of height H, the classical TreeHash needs 2H − 2−1 updates (2−1 because the last update
needs only to do one stepC). On the contrary the improved TreeHash needs 2H updates to reach
the same goal.
4.2 Computation of the Desired tree
In this section we will explain how the nodes in a Desired tree are computed and stored which hall-
marks the main difference of our algorithm to the algorithm in [7]. Recall that in [7] the TreeHash
algorithm of a Desired tree gets 2h× (2bottomLevel) updates for calculating its nodes. The 2h bottom
level nodes of a Desired tree are calculated during the first 2h × (2bottomLevel − 2−1) updates 6.
After calculating the bottom level nodes there are 2h−1 updates left ( from: (2h × (2bottomLevel))−
6 Remember that a classical TreeHash needs 2bottomLevel−2−1 updates to compute a bottom level node. Furthermore
in all our derivation h|H and h ≤ H hold.
7(2h × (2bottomLevel − 2−1)) = 2h−1). These are used to calculate the non-bottom level nodes of the
Desired tree [7]. There is no additional space needed to calculate the non-bottom level nodes from
the bottom level nodes. This because after calculating a new node, the left child is dropped and the
new value can be stored instead [7]. This approach can not be used with the improved TreeHash
from [8] without increasing the amount of updates the TreeHash of a Desired tree gets before
the Desired tree has to be finished. This is due to the fact, that the improved TreeHash needs
2h×(2bottomLevel) updates to compute all bottom level nodes of the Desired tree, which would leave
0 updates for the calculation of the non-bottom level nodes.
As described in Section 3 our algorithm uses a lower TreeHash and a higher TreeHash per subtree.
All the lower TreeHash instances use the same scheduling algorithm as in [8] with L − 1 updates
per round. The higher TreeHashes use a custom scheduling algorithm which executes an update
every 2bottomLevel rounds. The main difference vis-à-vis [7] is that we compute the nodes in the
Desired tree continuously during the calculations of the Desired tree, and not only at the end.
This approach distributes the leaf computations during the computation of a Desired tree more
equally than the one from [7].
Space analysis for Desired tree computation We will show that our algorithm needs L×(2h−1)
hash values for the Exist and Desired tree, when the authentication path is taken into account,
instead of L× (2h) hash values needed by the algorithm in [7].
The authentication path is a data structure which can store one node per level. Because the authen-
tication path is contained in all the Exist trees (which store only right nodes), right nodes on the
authentication path are contained in both structures and thus have to be held only once in memory.
The authentication path changes on a level k every 2k rounds and the higher TreeHash produces
a node on a level k′ every 2k′ rounds. Whenever a left node enters the authentication path, its right
sibling leaves the authentication path and can be discarded (with one exception discussed below).
From this we can conclude (ignoring the exception for now), that every 2k+1 rounds the Exist
tree discards a right node on level k and the higher TreeHash produces a left node on the same
level. This means the higher TreeHash can store one left node on each level using the space of the
discarded nodes in the Exist tree. The right nodes the higher TreeHash produces can be stored
using the space of the left node from which they have been computed.
We will now look at the exception mentioned above: a right node on level k which has a left node
as parent, cannot be discarded when it leaves the authentication path, because it is needed for
the computation of its parent as explained in [8]. It will be discarded 2k rounds after it left the
authentication path. During these 2k rounds there can be a left node with height k on the higher
TreeHash, for which fresh storage space must be provided. Fortunately this situation can only
occur if there is a right node on the authentication path (the sibling of the parent of the node which
could not be discarded). This right node is stored in both the Exist tree and the authentication
path and must be held in memory only once.
The special scheduling of the lower TreeHash (see Sec. 4.3) may compute a node on the bottom
level that is not immediately consumed by the higher TreeHash and therefore should be stored
until needed. We can store this node in the space reserved for the higher TreeHash, because the
left node with the highest level on a higher TreeHash is never stored, for the simple reason that it
is not needed for the calculation of any right node in the Desired tree (see Fig. 3).
From this we conclude that the authentication path and all the subtrees together use no more than
L× (2h− 1)+H space, where h is the height of a subtree, (2h− 1) is the amount of nodes a tree of
8height h needs, when it stores only right nodes (see Fig. 3) and H is the space needed to store the
current authentication path.
Sharing the same Data structure in both Exist and Desired Trees We now show that we
can store the nodes of the Exist tree and the Desired tree in one single tree data structure. This
is the case, because we can store two related7 nodes in the same slot. We can do this because when
a node in the Desired tree is stored, its related node in the Exist tree was already discarded. This
is trivial for left nodes, because they are never stored in the Exist or Desired tree. In the previous
section we showed that with one exception, the Exist tree discards a right node on a level in the
same round the higher TreeHash computes a left node on that level. The sibling of the left node
a higher TreeHash computes every 2l+1 rounds on a level l, is the node related to the right node
the Exist tree discards during this round. The right node which is computed 2l rounds later on the
level l is the node related to the discarded one and so it can be stored in the same slot of the data
structure. We now look at the special case: right nodes with a left node as parent (see Sec. 4.2).
Such a right node on level k will be discarded 2k rounds later than the other right nodes. It will
be discarded in the same round as the higher TreeHash produces its related node. We ensure that
the slot in the data structure is free by calculating left nodes in the authentication path before we
update the higher TreeHash (see Algorithm 8).
In Fig. 3 we show how the different nodes of the Desired and Exist trees are managed.
Space used for the key generation of the leaves In this section we will analyse the space used
by the deterministic PRNG, which calculates the private keys used in the leaf calculations. Supposing
the PRNG algorithm can generate any random number within its range without first calculating
all the preceding ones (indexed PRNG), then only one instance of the PRNG would be needed to
calculate the private keys for all the leaves. No PRNG’s currently recommended by NIST [9] have
this property. For both, the log and the fractal algorithms, solutions exist that use a PRNG which
calculates the leaves’ private keys in sequential order (continuous PRNG). This requires storing
multiple internal states of the continuous PRNG during the generation of the authentication paths.
The fractal algorithm stores as many continuous PRNG internal states as it has subtrees, whereas the
log algorithm stores two continuous PRNG internal states per TreeHash [8] plus one for calculating
the leaves that are left nodes. Our algorithm uses the same PRNG-approach as the fractal one. When
our algorithm skips a leaf calculation (because it would not contribute to the calculation of a right
node stored in a subtree, see Sec. 3), it still calculates the leaf’s private key and thus advances
the state of the PRNG. Therefore, our algorithm and the fractal one, store L additional continuous
PRNG states, whereas the log algorithm needs to store 2×(H−K)+1 continuous PRNG states [8].
For the space analysis we choose the state size of the PRNG equal to the output size of the hash
function used.
4.3 The TreeHash Algorithm
In this section we will explain the reason why we use the same TreeHash scheduling as in [8]
together with the improved TreeHash from [8] and what impact this has on the performance of the
algorithm. A TreeHash instance which calculates a node on height i and all its children, is called
7 Two nodes of either a Desired or an Exist tree are said to be related if they have the same position relative to
their root.
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Fig. 3: The left half of each circle represents the Exist tree and the right half the Desired tree.
The nodes with dotted lines are left nodes or the root and thus are not stored in the subtree, but
they may be stored in the authentication path or on the higher TreeHash. The markings on the
nodes have the following meanings: Label x: nodes already discarded (in case of Exist tree) or not
yet computed (in case of Desired tree). Label 1: nodes lying on the current authentication path.
Label 2: nodes lying on the upcoming authentication path. Label 3: nodes computed next by the
higher TreeHash. Label 4: left node on the higher TreeHash. Label 5: left nodes which do never
contribute to a right node calculation (not stored in higher TreeHash). Label 6: node which could
not yet be discarded, because it is needed for calculating a left node in the upcoming authentication
path.
TreeHashi. For each Desired tree in a subtree we need a lower TreeHashbottomLevel instance.
Each of these instances have up to bottomLevel + 1 nodes on their stack. If we compute them
simultaneously as it is done in [6], it can happen that each instance has its maximum amount of
nodes on their stack. The update scheduling algorithm from [8] uses less space by computing the
TreeHash instances in a way, that at any given round the associated stacks are mostly empty [5].
The basic idea is to start a freshly initialized TreeHashk only if there is no TreeHash with nodes
of height smaller than k on their stack. This is achieved by assigning each update to the TreeHash
instance with the smallest tail height (see Algorithm 3). The tail height is the smallest height for
which there is a node on the stack of the TreeHash. A terminated TreeHashk is considered to have
an infinite tail height and an empty one is considered to have a tail height of k. Furthermore, the
improved TreeHash from [8] we use, changes the definition of a step as compared to the classical
one. A stepC was originally considered in [6] as either calculating a leaf node or an inner node. This
is fine as long as a hash computation can be considered to be as expensive as a leaf calculation.
More often though, a leaf computation is significantly more expensive than the computation of an
inner node. This leads to a larger difference between the average and worst case time needed for a
stepC . In [8], a stepI consists of one leaf’s calculation and of as many inner node computations as
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possible before needing a new leaf, instead of processing just one leaf or one inner node as in the
classic case (see Algorithm 1).
Nodes’ supply for the higher TreeHash We wish to prove, that when we spend L− 1 updates
on the lower TreeHash (see Alg. 1), it produces nodes before the higher TreeHash needs them for
computing nodes in the Desired tree. To prove this we use the same approach as in [8]. We focus
on a subtree STk with a lower TreeHashh (bottom level of STk is h). We consider a time interval
starting at the initialization of TreeHashh and ending at the time when the next node at height
h is required by the higher TreeHash of STk. We call this node Needh. The higher TreeHash is
updated every 2h rounds and requires a bottom level node in each update. This means that in the
time considered we execute (L− 1)× 2h updates. A higher TreeHash of a subtree on a lower level
needs new nodes more frequently, because their authentication nodes change more often. For any
given TreeHashi with i < h, 2
h
2i
nodes are needed during the time interval defined above: 2i updates
are used up to complete a node on height i. Therefore TreeHashi requires 2
h
2i
× 2i = 2h updates to
produce all needed nodes. If there are N TreeHashi with i < h, then all of them together need at
most N × 2h updates to compute all their nodes. They may need less, because they may already
have nodes on their stack. There may be a partial contribution to any TreeHashj with j > h.
But they can only receive updates as long as they have nodes at height < h (tail height < h). A
TreeHashj needs at most 2h updates to raise its tail height to h. There are L−N − 2 TreeHashj
with j > h (the top subtree has no TreeHash). Together they need at most (L − N − 2) × 2h
updates. All TreeHashk with k 6= h need at most (L−N−2)×2h+N×2h = (L−2)×2h updates.
This leaves 2h updates for TreeHashh, which are enough to compute Needh.
Space and time analysis for the lower TreeHashes In [8], it was shown that when the improved
scheduling algorithm is used with n× 12 updates per round, a TreeHashl terminates at most 2l+1
rounds after its initialization (n corresponds to the actual number of TreeHash instances). This is
clearly enough for the log algorithm, because the authentication path needs a new right node on
level l every 2l+1 rounds. For our algorithm the higher TreeHash needs a new node every 2l rounds
which is twice as often. We thus need to distribute twice as many updates per lower TreeHash
instances with the improved scheduling algorithm from [8]. That means L− 1 updates per round in
total.
In addition, when the improved scheduling algorithm is used to calculate nodes with a set of
TreeHashi (where all i’s are different), these nodes can share a stack [8]. The amount of space
needed by this shared stack is the same as that of the TreeHashi with the highest i [8]. Since the
highest subtree (bottom level: H − h) does not have a lower TreeHash instance, the highest level
on which any node has to be computed by a lower TreeHash is the bottom level of the second
highest subtree (with bottom level: H−h−h). So, the shared stack of our algorithm stores at most
H − 2h hash values.
4.4 The space and time gains of our approach
In this section we will give the total space and time bounds of our algorithm, and compare them
with the log and fractal ones under the condition that a continuous PRNG with an internal state
equal in size of the hash value is used. We obtain the total space of our algorithm by summing up
the contributions of its different parts: L× (2h− 1) +H from the subtrees and authentication path
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(see Sec. 4.2), H − 2h from the lower TreeHashes (see Sec. 4.3) and L from the PRNG internal
states (see Sec. 4.2). This sums up to L× 2h + 2H − 2h times the hash value size.
For the time analysis we look at the number of leaves’ calculations per round. The improved
TreeHash makes one leaf calculation per update and we make at most (L−1) lower TreeHash up-
dates per round. The higher TreeHash never calculates leaves. So in the worst case all TreeHashes
together need (L − 1) leaves’ calculations per round. We need an additional leaf calculation every
two rounds to compute the left nodes as shown in [8]. Thus we need L leaves’ calculations per round
in the worst case. In the average case however, we need less, as the first node of the 2h bottom level
nodes of a Desired tree is not computed, since it is not needed to compute any right node in the
Desired tree.
This reduces the average–case time by a factor 2
h−1
2h
and leads to a total of 2
h−1
2h
× (L− 1) + 12
leaves’ computations per round. The term 12 enters the expression because the left node computation
needs a leaf every two rounds. The average case time bound holds true for only the first 2H − 2H−h
rounds. Thereafter less leaf computations would be needed on average, because some subtrees no
longer need a Desired tree. Table 1 summarizes the above results and Table 2 does the same for
the log space– and fractal–algorithm when a continuous PRNG with an internal state equal to the
size of a hash value used.
Bounds h = 1, L = H h = 2, L = H
2
h = log(H), L = H
log(H)
Worst case: space 4H − 2 4H − 4 H2
log(H)
+ 2H − 2log(H)
Average case: time H
2
3H−2
8
H−1
log(H)
+ 1
2
Worst case: time H H
2
H
log(H)
− 1
Table 1: Space–time trade–off of our Merkle tree traversal algorithm as a function of H (height of
the tree) with h (height of a subtree) as parameter.
Bounds Log [8] K = 2 Fractal [3] h = log(H)
Worst case: space 5.5H − 7 5H2+2H
2log(H)
Average case: time H
2
− 1
2
H
log(H)
− 1
Worst case: time H
2
2H
log(H)
− 2
Table 2: Space–time trade–off of log algorithm [8] and fractal algorithm [3] optimized for storage
space. The values in the Table include the space needed by the continuous PRNG.
When h = 2 our algorithm has better space and time bounds (or at least as good as in the
case of worst–case time) than the log algorithm [8]. When we choose the same space–time trade-off
parameter as in the fractal algorithm [3] (column h = log(H) in Table 1), our algorithm needs less
storage space.
12
5 Implementation
There are several aspects which are by purpose unspecified by the Merkle tree traversal algorithms.
These are the hash function, the deterministic pseudo–random number generator and the algorithm
used for the leaf calculation. The latter is defined by the usage of the tree. Although the hash function
and PRNG are independent of the trees’ usage, both have an impact on the cryptographic strength
and the performance. The hash function used for the traversal algorithm must be collision-resistant
as shown in [13]. Thus the main selection criteria for the hash function are good performance and
strong security. A suitable candidate is BLAKE [4].
As a PRNG we chose an algorithm based on a hash function. This choice has the advantage that
we do not need another cryptographic primitive. In [9], NIST has recommended two continuous
hash based PRNG’s named HASH_DBRG and HMAC_DBRG. Both of them have an internal
state composed of two values with the same length as the output length of the used hash function.
HASH_DBRG has the advantage that one of its two internal values solely depends on the seed and
does not change until a reseeding occurs. For Merkle trees, there is no reseeding necessary as long
as less than 248 leaves exist [9]. Hence, in our application one of its two internal values is the same
for all used HASH_DBRG instances within the same Merkle tree. We prefer HASH_DBRG over
HMAC_DBRG because it uses less space and is more performant.
6 Results
We compared the performance of our algorithm with both, the log algorithm from [8] and the fractal
algorithm from [3]. We chose as performance parameters the number of leaf computations and the
number of stored hash values. This choice is reasonable because the former is the most expensive
operation if the Merkle tree is used for signing, and the latter is a good indicator of the storage
space needed. Operations like computing a non–leaf node or generating a pseudo–random value
have nearly no impact on the performance in the range of H values of practical interest. A leaf
computation is exactly the same in each of the three algorithms and therefore only dependent on
the underlying hardware for its performance.
To be able to present cogently the results, each data point represents an aggregation over 210
rounds. Recall that one round corresponds to the calculation of one authentication path. In the case
of storage measurements one point represents the maximal amount of stored hash values at any
time during these 210 rounds. In the case of the leaf computation one point represents the average
number of leaves’ computations done in one round during the 210 rounds.
We will present the results for two sets of measurements with 216 leaves. For the first set we choose
the parameter such that each algorithm uses its minimal space. For our and the fractal algorithm
the minimal space for H = 16 is achieved with h = 2. In the case of the log algorithm we have set
K (defined in [8]) to 2 in order to achieve minimal space usage. The second set uses h = log(H) as
it was proposed in [3]. For the fractal and our algorithm this means h = 4 for H = 16 and K = 2
for the log algorithm. The NIST recommendation HASH_DBRG is used as PRNG for both sets
of measurements. The results of these measurements are shown in Fig. 5 for a similar space–time
trade-off as the fractal tree and in Fig. 4 for minimal storage space.
We see that in a setting where a good space–time trade-off is needed, our algorithm uses less
space and slightly more leaf calculations than the fractal algorithm (at most 12 more on average per
round). If a minimal space solution is needed, our algorithm with h = 2 uses less space and less leaf
calculations than both the log and the fractal algorithm.
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Fig. 4: Left : Set one: Maximal number of stored hash values as a function of rounds for minimal
space. Right : Number of calculated leaves as a function of rounds for minimal space. Parameters:
H = 16, h = 2 and K = 2. HASH_DBRG is used as pseudo–random number generator. One round
corresponds to the calculation of one authentication path.
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Fig. 5: Left : Set two: Number of stored hash values as a function of rounds for similar space–time
trade-off. Right : Maximal number of calculated leaves as a function of rounds for similar space–time
trade-off. Parameters: H = 16, h = 4 and K = 2. HASH_DBRG is used as pseudo–random number
generator. One round corresponds to the calculation of one authentication path.
In addition, the plots show a weak point of our algorithm compared with the log algorithm: the
number of leaves’ calculations is not constant. The fractal algorithm for similar parameter shows
even greater fluctuations, but they are not visible in Fig. 5, because they cancel each other out over
the 210 rounds. If we measure the first 27 rounds with no aggregation we see that the deviations of
our algorithm decrease markedly (see Fig. 6) compared to the fractal one.
The full package with source code and measurements results is available at [1].
7 Conclusion
We developed an algorithm for the Merkle tree traversal problem which combines the efficient
space-time trade-off from the fractal algorithm and the space efficiency from the log algorithm. An
exhaustive analysis of the space and time efficiency of our algorithm in function of the parameters
H and h has shown that if a continuous PRNG is used, our algorithm has a space advantage over
the log and fractal algorithms and a time advantage over the log algorithm.
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Fig. 6: Number of calculated leaves as function of rounds for similar space–time trade-off (first 128
rounds in detail). Parameters: H = 16 and h = 4. HASH_DBRG is used as pseudo–random number
generator. One round corresponds to the calculation of one authentication path.
We further programmed a low storage–space and a low time–overhead version of the algorithm
in Java and measured its performance with respect to the two different implementations. Our
implementation needs about a factor 2 less space than the fractal algorithm, when minimum space
is required.
Ours as well as the log and fractal algorithms suffer from a long initialisation time for large values
of H. This problem was solved by the CMSS [10] and GMSS [11] algorithms. These two algorithms
use a stacked series of Merkle trees where the higher trees sign the roots of their child trees and
the lowest tree is used for the real cryptographic purpose. Both of them thus rely on a solution of
the Merkle traversal problem for each layer, for which our algorithm could be used instead of the
current ones. It is possible to use different parameters for different layers in the CMSS or GMSS.
In addition, the higher trees used in these schemes favor Winternitz as leaf calculation function
which is significantly more expensive than an inner node computation, and thus can profit from the
improved TreeHash used in our algorithm. The XMSS [12] is an extension to the Merkle signature
scheme (MSS) which allows to use a hash function which is only second-pre–image resistant instead
of collision resistant. It is based on the log algorithm and the usage of a forward secure continuous
PRNG. Under these circumstances, our algorithm would be a good replacement for the log algorithm:
it would use less space and provide greater flexibility.
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A Appendix
A.1 Algorithms
The algorithm descriptions use an oracle for the leaves’ computations. The oracle gets the leaf’s
index as input. We should modify the algorithms (as explained in Sec. 4.2) in the case that the
leaf’s computation is based on a continuous PRNG and it needs a private key as input.
Our algorithm uses the following data structures:
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1. Authh, h = 0, ...,H − 1. An array of nodes that stores the current authentication path.
2. Subtreeh, h = 0, ..., L− 1. An array of subtree structures with the following properties:
(a) bottomLevel: the minimal height for which the subtree stores nodes.
(b) rootLevel: the height of the root of the subtree.
(c) tree: the data structure for the Exist and Desired tree with the following functions:
i. get(j, k): get kth node (from left to right) with height j in the subtree
ii. add(node): store node in the subtree
iii. remove(j, k): remove kth node (from left to right) with height j in the subtree
(d) stackHigh: the stack for the higher TreeHash.
(e) nextIndex: the index of the next leaf needed by the lower TreeHash.
(f) bottomLevelNode: the node of lower TreeHash which is stored outside the shared stack [8].
(g) stackLow: the stack for the lower TreeHash (the part of the shared stack currently containing
nodes for this Subtree [8]).
3. LeafCalc(i), i = 0, ..., 2H − 1. Oracle for calculating the leaf i.
Our algorithm has the following phases:
1. Init: TreeHash computes the root node. During this process it stores right nodes of the left–most
Exist trees and the nodes of the first authentication path(Algorithm 2)
2. Generation of the authentication paths: repeat 2H times:
(a) Output current authentication path Authh, h = 0, ...,H − 1
(b) Update lower TreeHashes (Algorithm 7)
(c) Compute next authentication path (Algorithm 8)
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Algorithm 2 Key generation (PK) and Merkle tree setup.
INPUT :
OUTPUT : PK
{Initialize L-1 subtrees}
for all Subtreei with i ∈ {0, · · · , L− 1} do
Subtreei.tree← empty
if i < (L-1) then
Subtreei.stackHigh← empty
Subtreei.stackLow← empty
end if
Subtreei.bottomLevel← i× h
Subtreei.rootLevel← Subtreei.bottomLevel + h
Subtreei.nextIndex← 2Subtreei.rootLevel − 1
end for
{Initialize Stack, set Leaf level k = 0}
k ← 0
Stack ← empty
Stack.push(LeafCalc(k))
k ← k + 1
while Stack.peek.height < H do
TreeHash(Stack,LeafCalc(k),Process0, null)
k ← k + 1
end while
PK ← Stack.pop
return PK
Algorithm 3 TailHeight: Calculation of the height of the lowest node on a stackLow
INPUT : subtree index i
OUTPUT : height
if Subtreei has a stackHigh ∧ ¬(Subtreei.bottomLevelNode) then
if Subtreei.stackLow == empty then
height← Subtreei.bottomLevel
else
height← Subtreei.stackLow.tosNode.height
end if
else
height←∞
end if
return height
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Algorithm 4 Process0
INPUT : Node, index j
OUTPUT : continue
if Node.index ≤ 2SubTreeForLevel(Node.height).rootLevel−Node.height ∧Node.index (mod 2) == 1 then
SubTreeForLevel(Node.height).tree.add(Node)
end if
if Node.index == 1 then
AuthNode.height ← Node
end if
return continue← 1
Algorithm 5 Process1:
INPUT : Node; subtree index j
OUTPUT : continue
if Node.height == Subtreej .bottomLevel then
Subtreej.bottomLevelNode← Node
continue← 0
else
continue← 1
end if
return continue
Algorithm 6 Process2:
INPUT : Node; subtree index i
OUTPUT : continue
if Node 6= dummy then
continue← 1
if Node.index (mod 2) == 1 then
Subtreei.tree.add(Node)
if Node.index/2 (mod 2Subtreei.rootLevel−Node.height−1) == 0 then
continue← 0
end if
end if
if Node.height == Subtreei.rootLevel− 1 then {Current Desired tree becomes new Exist tree}
if Subtreei.nextIndex + 1 >= 2H then {It was the last Desired}
Subtreei.stackHigh← remove
end if
end if
else
continue← 0
end if
return continue
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Algorithm 7 Distribution of updates to the active lower TreeHash instances:
INPUT : leaf index i ∈ {1, · · · , 2H − 1}
updates← number of desiredTree in SubTrees
repeat
{Find TreeHash instance with lowest tail height, on a tie use the one with lowest index}
s← min{l : ∀ TailHeight(l) == min
j=0,··· ,L−2
{TailHeight(j)}}
Subtrees.nextIndex← Subtrees.nextIndex + 1
if Subtrees.nextIndex (mod 2Subtrees.rootLevel) ≥ 2Subtrees.bottomLevel then
TreeHash(Subtrees.stackLow, LeafCalc(Subtrees.nextIndex), P rocess1, s)
else
if Subtrees.nextIndex + 1 (mod 2Subtrees.rootLevel) == 2Subtrees.bottomLevel then
Subtrees.bottomLevelNode← dummy
end if
end if
updates← updates− 1
until updates == 0
Algorithm 8 Generation of the next authentication path. (SubTreeForLevel(l) is the Subtree
containing level l.)
INPUT : leaf index i ∈ {1, · · · , 2H − 1}
{k is 0 if leaf i is a righ node and k 6= 0 means the height of the first parent of leaf i that is a right node}
k ← max
m=0,··· ,H
{m : i mod 2m == 0}
if k == 0 then
Auth0 ← LeafCalc(i− 1)
else
leftNode← Authk−1
rightNode← SubTreeForLevel(k− 1).tree.get(leftNode.index⊕ 1, k− 1)
Authk ← hash(leftNode||rightNode)
SubTreeForLevel(k− 1).tree.remove(j, k− 1)
end if
{Remove sibling of Authk}
if Authk.index/2 (mod 2) == 1 then
SubTreeForLevel(k).remove(Authk.index⊕ 1, k)
end if
{Run through stackHigh in all Subtrees whose AuthbottomLevel changed}
for all r ∈ {0 · · ·L− 2} where Subtreer.bottomLevel ≤ k do
if SubTree[r] has a desiredTree then
TreeHash(Subtreer.stackHigh, Subtreer.bottomLevelNode, P rocess2, r)
Subtreer.bottomLevelNode← remove
end if
end for
for all t ∈ {0 · · · k − 1} do
Autht ← SubTreeForLevel(t).tree.get(n, (i/2t)⊕ 1)
end for
return Authj ∀j ∈ {0, · · · , H − 1}
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